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Abstract
In this paper we survey recent works on rational inattention (RI) in macroeconomics within
the dynamic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) setting. We rst discuss how RI a¤ects con-
sumption smoothness and sensitivity, precautionary savings, asset pricing, portfolio choice,
and aggregate uctuations in the univariate case. We then discuss the applications of RI
to macroeconomic models of permanent income and price-setting in the multivariate case.
Finally, we briey discuss how RI can be applied to non-LQG settings.
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1 Introduction
The real world is complicated, with in principle hundreds of relevant variables that individuals
should track in order to make economic decisions. Obviously, few (if any) households actually pay
attention to that many variables. It is straightforward to assume agents ignore certain variables
when they make decisions, but doing so abandons standard economic assumptions that agents
will make choices that are optimal for themselves  that is, behavior is deliberate. Rational
inattention (henceforth RI) to variables is the assumption that individuals have limited attention
but are allowed to decide what they care most about, and therefore pay the most attention to.
In this paper we survey the applications of rational inattention in macroeconomics. RI was
rst proposed and introduced into economics by Sims (2003). In a previous paper (Sims 1998) he
made the point that stickiness appears pervasive in the data, and therefore models that rely on
some forms of adjustment costs (random opportunities to change prices or wages, for example, or
costs of altering portfolios) must have adjustment costs everywhere; the resulting proliferation of
essentially free parameters (the costs are estimated to match the stickiness and cannot generally
be evaluated in a model-independent manner) makes the underlying models hard to test in a
disciplined way and blurs the line between identifying assumptions and overidentifying restric-
tions (Kydland and Prescott 1996). In contrast, Sims (2003) proposed a single mechanism that
generates stickiness pervasively agents have limited information about the state of the world
and "learn" slowly because they cannot process information in unlimited amounts.
The key innovation relative to standard noisy rational expectations models (like Kydland and
Prescott 1982 or Cooley and Hansen 1997) is that RI hypothesis permits agents to design the
distribution of noise terms by focusing limited attention on certain variables at the expense of
others. Under RI, agents respond to changes in the true underlying state slowly because it takes
time for them to learn exactly what the new state is they cannot learn without error because the
information ow required to perfectly describe the state is larger than their "Shannon channel"
permits. Thus, the distribution of the RI-induced noise is an outcome of optimal choice will adapt
to changing circumstances in the economy.1
In general, the RI model is intractable, and obviously intractable models are useless.2 There
1Gabaix (2013) focuses on an alternative mechanism, sparsity, in which agents choose to ignore variables com-
pletely that do not a¤ect their payo¤s too much. However, his mechanism does not explain why agents dont pay
attention to all variables, which RI does.
2We are reminded of the joke about a man searching for his car keys under the lamppost, even though he dropped
them out in the dark alley. One cannot get anywhere writing down models that cannot be solved; while searching
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are a number of obstacles that arise. First, the choice of the agents in an RI problem is the
joint distribution of choices and states, which can easily be high-dimensional unless the agent
nds it optimal to choose the distribution from a class that can be described with a small number
of parameters (such as the Gaussian or normal distribution, which is completely described by
only two numbers). Unfortunately, Matejka and Sims (2011) and Saint-Paul (2011) show that
generically the RI problem will generate discrete distributions that have gaps and holes, making
them impossible to parametrize with a low-dimensional vector; related numerical results can be
found in Lewis (2009), Batchuluun, Luo, and Young (2009), and Tutino (2012). Second, the
information ow constraint means that the posterior (the distribution over states after the signal
is received) cannot be too far from the prior, so the state is high-dimensional as well. As a
result, the researcher rapidly encounters the "curse of dimensionality" and only short horizons or
small models are feasible. In addition, the law of motion that ties the prior to the posterior is
not transparent, so that it becomes di¢ cult to describe what the agent is "paying attention to",
which makes explanation of the results challenging.
Fortunately, there is a case that is (nearly) analytically tractable. As shown in Sims (2003,
2010), RI models are easiest to solve and handle when random variables are all jointly normal.
Specically, if random shocks are all Gaussian, the payo¤ function is quadratic, all constraints
are linear, and the prior distribution is Gaussian (LQG), the ex post distribution of the true state
upon receiving the observations and the distribution of the noise will also be Gaussian; as noted
already, describing a Gaussian distribution only requires knowledge to two numbers (the mean
and the variance) so the dimensionality of the problem is dramatically reduced. Furthermore,
the variance converges rapidly to a constant in the steady state, reducing the problem to nding
the evolution of the mean and the constant value for the variance and then running the signals
through the Kalman lter to link priors and posteriors. Contributions to the RI-LQG literature
include Adam (2005), Kasa (2006), Luo (2008), Luo and Young (2010a, 2010b, 2013), Ma´ckowiak
and Wiederholt (2009, 2013), Melosi (2009), Reis (2011), Paciello and Wiederholt (2012), Luo,
Nie, and Young (2012), and Kim, Ko, and Yun (2012).3
under the lamppost might not nd the keys immediately, the hope is that eventually we learn how to make the
lamp bright enough to illuminate the keys.
3Other papers assume ex post Gaussian distributions and Gaussian noise but adopt exponential or constant-
absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) preferences, including Peng (2004), Peng and Xiong (2005), Mondria (2010), and
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010). Since both the optimality of ex post Gaussianity and the standard
Kalman lter are based on the LQG specication, the applications of these results in the RI models with CARA
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In this paper we rst present a general discrete-time dynamic LQG setting in which RI is
introduced. We then present how RI can be applied to a variety of macroeconomic models.
Particurly, we divide the RI-LQG models into two categories: (i) the univariate case and (ii)
the multivariate case. In the rst case, the information-processing constraint (i.e., the reduction
in uncertainty about the state variable is bounded by a nite channel capacity) can uniquely
determine the conditional variance of the state variable; consequently, the variance of the RI-
induced noise and the Kalman gain can also be determined. In the rst application, we consider
the permanent income model with RI proposed and solved in Luo (2008). As shown in Luo (2008),
using the method of state-space-reduction and the original multivariate model can be reduced to
a univariate model and can thus be solved explicitly. Using the closed-form solution, we discuss
the implications of RI for consumption dynamics and asset pricing.4 Specically, we discuss how
RI can be a potential explanation for the excess smoothness and excess sensitivity puzzles in the
consumption literature. We also argue that the RI model with xed information-processing cost
does a better job at replicating the di¤erent consumption behavior in emerging and developed
small open economies studied in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Luo, Nie, and Young (2012).5
In another application, we discuss how RI increases long-run consumpion risk and reduces the
optimal share invested in the risky asset; consequently, the RI model can generate more realist
joint behavior of aggregate consumption and the equity return. In a robust (RB) or risk-sensitve
(RS) permanent income model, we show that the interaction of RI and RB (or RS) can increase the
total amount of uncertainty facing the consumer and thus leads to more precautionary savings. As
shown in Luo and Young (2010a), under RB or RS, the certainty equivalence principle no longer
holds and the resulting decision rules depend explicitly on the variance of the shocks, producing
precautionary savings. Fortunately, the value functions are still quadratic functions of the states,
leading again to the optimality of Gaussian noise in the RI model. Thus, we can preserve the
tractability of the LQ permanent income model.
We then move on to study the multivariate case. In this case given channel capacity the
conditional variance-covariance matrix can be obtained by solving a semidenite programming
preferences are only approximately valid. There are no estimates of the approximation error in the literature.
4As argued in Sims (2010), RI can be modelled by assuming either xed channel capacity or xed marginal cost
of information processing. In this paper we also discuss how the two ways lead to di¤erent conclusions about the
e¤ects of RI.
5Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) document that the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth in
emerging countries is signicantly greater than that in developed countries.
3
problem in which the inattentive agent minimizes the expected loss due to information-processing
constraints. We discuss the connection between this problem and the celebrated "reverse water-
lling problem" from information theory. The basic intuition is that agents e¤ectively have
a budget of attention that they "pour" into bins representing each variable, with deeper bins
representing variables that are more volatile or less important for payo¤s; the unlled part of the
bin is the residual noise left in the observation of that particular variable. The solution to the
problem is the variance-covariance matrix of the noise vector, from which we can recover the gain
of the Kalman lter and the posterior distribution. Unlike the univariate case, preferences and
budget constraints matter for the attention allocation problem, since as noted the size of the bins
depend on how much particular variables a¤ect payo¤s (either directly or indirectly through the
constraints). Unfortunately, analytical solutions to the semidenite programming problem are
not available, unlike the standard water-lling problem, because the variables do not generally
enter the payo¤ function symmetrically. Numerical solutions are presented to describe how agents
trade o¤ attention.
Lastly, we study the implications of RI for price stickiness, the original motivation of Sims
(1998). Following Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt (2009), we study the price-setting decision of a rm
that has information-ow constraints. Consistent with some VAR evidence, we nd that rm
prices respond immediately and strongly to individual-level productivity shocks, less quickly and
completely to aggregate productivity shocks, and very slowly and incompletely to monetary policy
shocks (movements in the nominal interest rate). The intuition is straightforward individual
productivity shocks are the dominant source of movements in prots, so the rm pays a lot of
attention to them so that changes are quickly observed and incorporated into prices. Aggregate
productivity shocks are less volatile and less important, so their movements are not tracked as
closely, and monetary policy is almost completely ignored.
These results are not merely theoretical curiosities. Paciello and Wiederholt (2012) show
that they fundamentally change the nature of optimal monetary policy. In the literature there
has appeared the "divine coincidence" in which there appears to be no tradeo¤ between the
two primary goals of the Federal Reserve (stabilizing output and ination)  it turns out that
stabilizing prices has the e¤ect of stabilizing output. In models where information is exogenously
restricted (Woodford 2001), this coincidence disappears  the Fed must make a decision about
how much output volatility it is willing to tolerate to limit ination volatility. In addition, there
is no gain to commitment future monetary policy promises do not matter so the models are
4
incapable of thinking about problems of "forward guidance". In contrast, when attention is
limited but endogenous, the divine coincidence reappears and commitment is valuable because
the Fed will be tempted to exploit the predetermined attention decision to move variables that
agents are not tracking. If RI is a good description of the world, then it will have practical
consequences for the science of monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the basics of rate distortion theory, which
forms the underlying technology of rational inattention. We then discuss the tracking problem of
RI explicitly. Next we specialize this problem to the linear-quadratic-Gaussian environment that
provides the most tractability, describing it again in generic terms. Then we consider a sequence
of examples in the LQG framework that highlight various questions in macroeconomics that RI
has been used to study.
2 Rate Distortion and Channel Capacity
Describing an arbitrary real number requires an innite amount of information (think about
how many digits you need to describe ) and so cannot be done in practice without some error.
Rate distortion theory is about the connection between the amount of information permitted
and the resulting error in representation  how well can one do if one is restricted to some
prescribed nite information ow? To give a concrete example, suppose one has a random
variable X  N  0; 2 and wants to represent it with some function Y (X) that requires only a
nite amount of information (1 bit). Errors are punished using a squared deviation, so that the
goal is to choose Y (X) to minimize
W = E
h
(X   Y (X))2
i
:
We must choose the weight and the location of the nodes, subject to the constraint that it can
result in only 1 bit being transmitted. The solution is
Y (x) =
8<: 
q
2
 if x  0
 
q
2
 if x < 0;
that is, each representation equals the conditional mean of its region, with equal mass attached
to each point. With more than 1 bit the problem becomes one of choosing the regions and the
masses.
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More generally, we can dene the problem as choosing some function Y (X) to minimize the
expected sum of squared errors:
W = E
h
(X   Y (X))T (X   Y (X))
i
subject to a limit on how di¤erent the underlying density of X and the conditional density of Y
given X can be, giving rise to the notion of an information rate distortion function.
Denition 1 The information rate distortion function R (D) for a source random variable X
with distribution f (x) and distortion measure d (x; y) is dened as
R (D) = min
p(yjx)
fI (X;Y )g
such that Z
x;y
f (x) p (yjx) d (x; y)  D:
The problem also requires that p (yjx) be a distribution (nonnegative, integrate to 1) and
that the joint distribution P (x; y) = f (x) p (yjx) is also a distribution and satises the distortion
constraint. The relevant result for a vector of independent Gaussian sources is now given.
Theorem 2 Let Xi  N
 
0; 2i

for i 2 f1; 2; :::;mg be independent and let the distortion function
be d (x; y) =
Pm
i=1 (xi   yi)2. Then the information rate distortion function is
R (D) =
1
2
mX
i=1
log

2i
Di

where
Di =
8<:  if  < 2i2i if   2i
and where  is a constant chosen such that
Pm
i=1Di = D.
 is related to the Lagrange multiplier on the information ow constraint and thus represents
the marginal increase in information ow needed if the maximal distortion is to be decreased.
This problem is often called the reverse water-lling problem (see Figure ??); the depth a
particular variable is the variance 2i , the amount of attention allocated to each variable is related
to the di¤erence between  and 2i , denoted b2i . Essentially, one can interpret the solution as
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pouringin attention (variance reduction) to the channel with the largest current capacity until
the nite attention is exhausted. The solution is
Y  N
0BBB@0;
26664
b21    0
...
. . .
...
0    b2m
37775
1CCCA ;
where b2i = max2i  Di; 0	 and Di = min; 2i 	. If 2i > , Di =  and b2i = 2i   ; that
is, variables with prior variances higher than  are allocated attention su¢ cient to bring their
posterior variance down to . In contrast, if 2i < , Di = 
2
i and b2i = 0, so that this variable
is ignored completely (see x4 in Figure 1).6 The geometric interpretation of the solution method
is to start  at the bottom of the graph and raise it until the shaded area equals the permitted
amount of information ow.7
If the variables are not independent, we simply apply the Spectral Decomposition Theorem to
the variance-covariance matrix  so that  = P
P 1 and solve the problem using the diagonal
elements of 
 (which are the eigenvalues of ). Similarly, if we have a Gaussian stochastic process
one can decompose it by frequencies (using a Fourier transfrom) and apply the problem to each
frequency (which are uncorrelated).
Unfortunately, in economics not all distortions are equal it is not simply the variance that
matters, but rather a weighted average that depends on how each variable contributes to payo¤s:
W = E
h
(X   Y (X))T Z (X   Y (X))
i
is the appropriate objective function, where Z is a positive semidenite symmetric matrix (needed
to guarantee the minimum exists). Unless Z happens to be diagonal the water-lling solu-
tion, while still providing the intuition for the attention allocation problem, no longer supplies
a constructive method for nding that solution. We will discuss the numerical problems that
multivariate RI problems pose later in this survey.
6One can also show that any information rate distortion R > R (D) is achievable by some representation (which
is why we do not need to dene R (D) in terms of inma); this result is nontrivial, but is of little interest since we
are not trying to discover the way agents codetheir observations, only what they can achieve by doing so.
7Gabaix (2013) introduces the notion of "sparsity" in decision-making, where agents choose to completely ignore
changes in random variables that do not a¤ect their payo¤s by at least some xed amount. RI could in principle
provide a deeper foundation for his assumption, but the mechanics of his implementation are very di¤erent.
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3 The Canonical Rational Inattention Tracking Problem
Suppose a decision maker has the goal of maximizing some function u (jy   xj) (such as minus a
quadratic loss) subject to information-processing constraints. The problem solved by the decision
maker is
max
f;x
Z
u (jy   xj) f (x; y)x (dx)y (dy)

(1)
subject toZ
log (f (x; y)) f (x; y)x (dx)y (dy) +
Z
log
Z
f
 
x; y0

y
 
dy0

f (x; y)x (dx)y (dy)  ;
(2)Z
f (x; y)x (dx) = g (y) (3)
for given density g (y), and
f (x; y)  0 (4)Z
f (x; y)x (dx)y (dy) = 1: (5)
The rst constraint says that the information ow generated by an observation of y is less than
, the second says that the marginal of the joint distribution f (x; y) at any y should be the
exogenous distribution of y, and the last two require that the joint density be nonnegative and
integrate to 1. Rather than analyze this problem in detail (which is the goal of Matejka and Sims
2010), we simply note their key result and move on to a specialized environment.
Theorem 3 Suppose that exp (u (jy   xj)) is analytic and positive on the real line, u is non-
increasing and non-constant, and g has bounded support. Then the density of x (denoted p (x))
has positive value on a nite set of points in the support of g.
This result is generic information-constrained problems with nite support will have discrete
solutions and implies that unless one knows the form of the optimal f (x; y) one should expect
discreteness in any approximation solution found numerically. This discreteness is not trivial
in general, as the distributions can have holes (see Batchuluun, Luo, and Young 2009 for an
example), and thus poses a di¢ cult numerical problem as the number of states gets large and the
problem hits many nonnegativity constraints.
In the rest of this survey we will use quadratic approximations to agent objectives and linear
constraints, exploiting the following result from Sims (2003):
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Theorem 4 Suppose u is quadratic and y is Gaussian. Then f (x; y) is Gaussian.
This result substantially simplies the numerical solutions, since Gaussian distributions have
only two parameters and the IPC can be reduced to the di¤erence of variances between the prior
and the posterior (plus a technical condition that the di¤erence be positive semidenite, which is
not necessary in the fully-nonlinear problem). Supposing that24 X
Y
35  N
0@0;
24 xx xy
Txy yy
351A
the IPC becomes
 1
2
log
I    1yy Txy 1xxxy  :
Exploiting the Toeplitz structure of the variance-covariance matrices ii Sims (2003) notes that
this constraint can be written in the frequency domain as
 1
2
Z 
 
log
 
1  jSxy (!)j
2
jSx (!)j jSy (!)j
!
d!  ;
where the term in parentheses is one minus the coherence between X and Y at frequency !.8 The
interpretation of this representation of the constraint is that there should be as much comovement
between the true state and the estimated state as possible, given the limit of changes in
entropy. Using this formulation it is possible then to show the variance of the noise relative to
the signal must increase as the frequency gets shorter, so that agents with rational inattention
will not respond to high frequency variations in the target.
4 Modeling Rational Inattention within the LQG Setting
In this section we will rewrite the tracking problem as a standard linear-quadratic regulator
problem and use that problem to illustrate general solutions.
8A Toeplitz matrix has the structure 2666664
d e f g
c d e f
b c d e
a b c d
3777775 ;
where all diagonals are even. The variance-covariance matrix of a sample from an autoregressive process has this
form. Coherence measures the comovement of two random processes at a given frequency.
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4.1 Full-information Rational Expectations LQG Model
Consider the following standard full-information rational expectations dynamic linear-quadratic-
Gaussian (LQG) model:
v (s0) = maxfct;st+1g
E0
" 1X
t=0
t
 
sTt Qst + c
T
t Rct + 2c
T
t Wst
#
; (6)
subject to
st+1 = Ast +Bct + "t+1; (7)
with s0 known and given, where  < 1 is the discount factor, st is a (n 1) state vector, ct is a
(k  1) control vector, "t+1 is an iid (n 1) vector of Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and
covariance matrix 
, and Et [] denotes the mathematical expectation of a random variable given
information processed at t. We assume that Q, R, and W are such that the objective function is
jointly concave in st and ct, and the usual conditions required for the optimal policy to exist are
satised.9
When the agent can fully observe the state st, the model is a standard linear-quadratic reg-
ulator problem. Guess that the value function at t is v (st) = sTt Pst. Solving the corresponding
Bellman equation
sTt Pst = maxct

sTt Qst + c
T
t Rct + 2c
T
t Wst + Et
 
sTt A
T + cTt B
T + "Tt+1

P (Ast +Bct + "t+1)
	
;
yields the decision rule
ct =  Fst; (8)
and the Riccati equation is
P = Q+ F TRF   2F TW +   AT   F TBT P (A BF ) ; (9)
where
F =
 
R+ BTPB
 1  
W + BTPA

: (10)
Iterating on the matrix Riccati equation (9) uniquely determines P , since the equation denes a
contraction mapping from the space of negative semidenite matrices back to itself:
T (P ) = Q+ F (P )T RF (P )  2F (P )T W + 

AT   F (P )T BT

P (A BF (P )) :
Using P , we can determine F in the optimal policy (10).
9These conditions are known as detectability and stabilizability in the control literature. They amount to
assumptions that states can be observed with su¢ cient accuracy and respond su¢ ciently to controls to avoid
violating transversality conditions. Under full information detectability is irrelevant.
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4.2 Introducing Rational Inattention
With nite capacity  2 (0;1) ; a random variable fstg following a continuous distribution cannot
be observed without error and thus the information set at time t+1, denoted It+1, is generated by
the entire history of noisy signals
n
sj
ot+1
j=0
. Following the literature, we assume the noisy signal
takes the additive form
st+1 = st+1 + t+1;
where t+1 is the endogenous noise caused by nite capacity. We further assume that t+1 is an iid
idiosyncratic shock and is independent of the fundamental shocks hitting the economy. The reason
that the RI-induced noise is idiosyncratic is that the endogenous noise arises from the consumers
own internal information-processing constraint. Agents with nite capacity will choose a new
signal st+1 2 It+1 =

s1; s2;   ; st+1
	
that reduces the uncertainty about the variable st+1 as
much as possible. Formally, this idea can be described by the information constraint
H (st+1jIt) H (st+1jIt+1) ; (11)
where  is the investors information channel capacity, H (st+1j It) denotes the entropy of the
state prior to observing the new signal at t+ 1, and H (st+1j It+1) is the entropy after observing
the new signal.  imposes an upper bound on the amount of information ow that is, the change
in the entropy that can be transmitted in any given period. Finally, following the literature, we
suppose that the prior distribution of st+1 is Gaussian.
In the LQG environment, as has been shown in Sims (2003, 2006), the true state under RI
also follows a normal distribution stjIt  N (E [stjIt] ;t), where t = Et
h
(st   bst) (st   bst)T i.
In addition, given that the noisy signal takes the additive form st+1 = st+1 + t+1, the noise t+1
will also be Gaussian. In this case, (11) reduces to
ln (j	tj)  ln (jt+1j)  2; (12)
where 	t = ATtA + 
 and t+1 are the conditional variance-covariance matrices prior to and
after observing the new signal, respectively. Since more information about the state is better in
single-agent models, this constraint will be binding.10. We will exploit the formula for updating
the conditional variance-covariance matrix of a Gaussian distribution  in the steady state:
 1 =  1  	 1: (13)
10By betterwe mean that conditional on draws by nature for the true state, the expected utility of the agent
increases if information about that state is improved.
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The evolution of the estimated state bst is governed by the Kalman ltering equation
bst+1 = (1  ) (Abst +Bct) + st+1; (14)
where  =  1. Combining (7) with (14) yields
bst+1 = Abst +Bct + t+1; (15)
where
t+1 = A (st   bst) +  (t+1 + t+1)
with t+1jIt  N (0;) and  = 	  .
In the RI literature, the following two-stage procedure is adopted to solve the RI problem:
1. In the rst stage, we take the steady state conditional variance of the state vector () as
given. Given , all the other matrices, 	, , , and , can be uniquely determined, and we
obtain the constrol by solving the following standard dynamic program in which the state
is bst:
v (bst) = maxfctg Et sTt Qst + cTt Rct + 2cTt Wst + v (bst+1) ; (16)
subject to (15). We exploit the certainty equivalence property of LQG models here to
separate forecasting from control.
2. In the second stage, given that the value functions under full information and imperfect
information are v (st) = sTt Pst and bv (bst) = bsTt bPbst, respectively, we can compute the optimal
 by minimizing the expected welfare loss due to RI subject to the information-processing
constraint, (11) and an additional no subsidizationconstraint
ATA+ 
  : (17)
The no subsidizationconstraint is to be read as the matrix dened as the di¤erence between
the posterior and the prior element-by-element must be positive semidenite.This constraint is
termed a no subsidization condition, as it implies that an agent cannot reduce one variables
entropy by more than  by increasing the entropy of another; one can also interpret it as a "no
forgetting" condition, since it can be viewed as prohibiting the agent from forgetting information
about one variable in order to learn more about another.11 It is worth noting that this constraint
11Fans of the TV show Married with Children might recall an episode where Kelly Bundy is learning facts
for a trivia contest  eventually her brain lls up so that every new fact pushes an old one out. The "no
forgetting" condition means that Kelly has unlimited capacity to store existing knowledge; the constraint is on
the new information that she can learn.
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takes the form of restrictions on eigenvalues and thus is not linear in the multivariate case while
it is automatically satised in the univariate case. We will survey applications of the univariate
case in the next section, and then survey applications in the multivariate case.
Before doing so, we think it useful to describe briey the essence of decision-making by an
agent facing an information-processing constraint. The agent is choosing a joint distribution
of future states st+1 and controls ct and informing "nature" to give him an outcome randomly
according to this distribution once conditioned on the true (but unknown to the agent) state.
That outcome serves as the signal st+1 which permits the agent to update her beliefs, since there
is information in the signal whenever the agent chooses the distribution to be informative given
that signal.
5 The Univariate Case
5.1 Fixed Channel Capacity or FixedMarginal Cost of Information-Processing
Fixed Channel Capacity. In the univariate state case in which n = 1, (12) fully determines the
value of the steady state conditional variance :
 =


exp (2) A2 ; (18)
which means that  is entirely determined by the variance of the exogenous shock (
) and the
exogenously given capacity ().12 Given this , we can use (13) to recover the variance of the
endogenous noise () as
 =
 
 1  	 1 1 ; (19)
where 	 = A2 + 
, and also to compute the Kalman gain :
 =  1 = 1  	 1; (20)
which reduces to  = 1  1exp(2) using (18) and (19).
Given that  is xed, (18), (19), and (20) imply that a change in 
 will lead to the same
change in , 	, and , but has no impact on . In other words, agents with xed capacity will
behave as if facing noise whose nature changes systematically as the dynamic properties of the
economy change, i.e., the change in policy does not change the models dynamics. However, if an
12Note that here we need to impose the restriction exp (2)   A2 > 0. If this condition fails, the state is not
stabilizable and the unconditional variance diverges.
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increase in 
 leads to higher marginal welfare losses due to imperfect observations, some capacity
may be reallocated from other sources to reduce the welfare losses due to low capacity. In this
case,  will change accordingly as it is completely determined by capacity ; consequently, the
dynamic behavior of the model will also change in response to the change in 
.
Fixed Marginal Cost of Information-Processing. As argued in Sims (2010), instead of using
xed nite channel capacity to model limited information-processing ability, it is also reasonable
to assume that the marginal cost of information processing is constant. That is, the Lagrange
multiplier on (12) is constant.13 In the univariate case, if the decision rule under full information
is ct = Hst and the objective of the agent with nite capacity is to minimize
P1
t=0 
t (ct   ct )2,
the optimization problem reduces to
min
t
1X
t=0
t

H2t +  ln

A2t 1 + 

t

;
where t is the conditional variance at t,  is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (12), and
we impose the restriction that A = 1 for simplicity. Solving this problem yields the optimal
steady state conditional variance:
 =
  (
H   A) +
q
(
H   A)2 + 4
A2
2HA2
> 0: (21)
It is straightforward to show that as  goes to 0,  = 0; and as  goes to 1,  =1. Comparing
(21) with (18), it is clear that the two modeling strategies are observationally equivalent in the
sense that they lead to the same conditional variance if the following equality holds:
 =
1
2
ln
0@A2 + 2HA2
  [H  A (=
)] +
q
[H  A (=
)]2 + 4A2 (=
)
1A : (22)
In this case, the Kalman gain is
 = 1 
8<:A2 + 2HA2  [H  A (=
)] +q[H  A (=
)]2 + 4A2 (=
)
9=;
 1
: (23)
It is obvious that  converges to its lower limit = ln (A) as  goes to 1; and it converges to 1
as  goes to 0.14 In other words, using the RI modeling strategy, the agent is allowed to adjust
13Formally, the assumption is that  is a choice variable and the utility cost function is  for some constant
. Quadratic cost functions of the form 2=2 could also be accomodated, where the marginal cost of attention is
increasing in the amount of attention already allocated.
14We require here that H 6= 0; that is, the state must be detectable. If the state is not detectable there is no
point in allocating attention to monitoring it.
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the optimal level of capacity in such a way that the marginal cost of information-processing for
the problem at hand remains constant. Note that this result is consistent with the concept of
elasticcapacity proposed in Kahneman (1973).
Furthermore, it is clear from (22) that if the cost of information processing () is xed, an
increase in fundamental uncertainty (
) will lead to higher capacity () devoted to monitoring
the evolution of the state. We now consider a policy experiment: 
 is scaled up due to a change
in policy. If we adopt the assumption that  is xed, (21) means that there is a less change in
 because @ ln @ ln 
 < 1. Note that in the xed  case,
@ ln 
@ ln 
 = 1. Consequently, a change in 

will change  and the models dynamics if the inattentive agent is facing xed marginal cost of
information. Therefore, di¤erent ways of modeling RI may lead to di¤erent policy implications.15
5.2 Extension to Correlated Shocks and Noises
In the above analysis, we assumed that the exogenous fundamental shock and noise are uncorre-
lated. Luo and Young (2013) discuss how correlated shocks and noises a¤ect the implications of
SE and RI for the models dynamic behavior. It is easy to think of situations where the shocks
a¤ect the measurement process; for example, in the US the Bureau of Economic Activity measures
GDP and requires costly labor allocation, so that a shock that reduces productivity could simulta-
neously reduce true GDP and result in less labor allocated to its measurement, generating larger
noise. Other examples can be found in physical systems that are less relevant for economics.
Luo and Young (2013) consider a case in which the fundamental shock (") and the noise shock
() are correlated:
corr ("t+1; t+1) = ;
cov ("t+1; t+1) =   = 
p


p
;
where  is the correlation coe¢ cient between "t+1 and t+1, 
 = var ("t+1) and  = var (t+1). In
this case, the Kalman gain is
 = (	 +  ) (	 +  + 2 ) 1 ; (24)
15Note that these two di¤erent ways to model RI are very similar to the constraint and multiplier preferences
adopted by Hansen and Sargent (2007) to model aversion to model misspecication. They also established the
observational equivalence between the two preferences within the LQG setting. Luo and Young (2010a) extend this
equivalence to RI settings.
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and the updating formula for the conditional variance is
 = 	  (	 +  )2 (	 +  + 2 ) 1 ; (25)
where 	 = 
 + A2. Just like the case without the correlation, given  and  , (24) and (25)
jointly determine the steady state (;).
Under RI, correlation between shocks and noises does not a¤ect the conditional variance 
since  = 

A2 exp(2) . In the steady state, (25) can be rewritten as the following quadratic equation
in terms of
p
:

2
  (	  ) + 2p
p + 	 = 0, which can be solved for
 =
 
 p
 +p22
  	 [2
  (	  )]
2
  (	  )
!2
: (26)
It is clear from (26) that if  is xed, the change in 
 will lead to the same change in , 	, and
, but has no e¤ect on the Kalman gain  =  1. That is, the presence of correlated noise does
not change the dynamic behavior of the model.
In contrast, consider the RI problem with a xed information-processing cost (). From (21)
and (26), it is clear that in the presence of correlated noise ( > 0), there is a smaller change in
 when there is a change in 
 because @ ln @ ln 
 < 1, and consequently, the change in 
 will also
change  because  depends on the interactions between 
 and .
5.3 Applications
We now specialize our generic LQG RI problem to study the dynamics of consumption and the
pricing of assets. We also introduce a related informational distortion that has proven useful
at matching these facts: the idea of model uncertainty. Although we will discuss it in more
detail below, we nd it useful to present a brief discussion of the relationship between the two
frictions. With RI, the agent is uncertain of the current value of the state, but is certain about
the distribution of future states (conditional on each possible value of the current state). With
model uncertainty the agent is certain of the current state but is uncertain about the distribution
of future states.
5.3.1 Consumption Dynamics under RI
Sims (2003) examined how RI a¤ects consumption dynamics when the agent only has limited
capacity when processing information. Luo (2008) showed that the RI permanent income can be
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solved explicitly even if the income process is not iid, and then examines how RI can resolve the
well-known excess smoothness and excess sensitivity puzzles; that model admits a reduction to
a single state variable.16 In Luo (2008), households solve the following dynamic consumption-
savings problem
v(s0) = maxfctg
(
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu(ct)
#)
(27)
subject to
st+1 = Rst   ct + t+1; (28)
where u(ct) =  12 (c  ct)2 is the period utility function, c > 0 is the bliss point, ct is consumption,
st = wt +
1
R
1X
j=0
R jEt [yt+j ] (29)
is permanent income (the expected present value of lifetime resources), consisting of nancial
wealth (wt) plus human wealth (i.e., the expected discounted present value of current and future
labor income, y),
t+1 =
1
R
1X
j=t+1

1
R
j (t+1)
(Et+1   Et) [yj ] ; (30)
is the time (t+ 1) innovation to permanent income with mean 0 and variance !2 , wt is cash-on-
hand (or market resources), yt is a general income process with Gaussian white noise innovations,
 is the discount factor, and R is the constant gross interest rate at which the consumer can borrow
and lend freely.17 We assume y follows an AR(1) process with persistence coe¢ cient  2 [0; 1],
yt+1 = yt + "t+1, where "t+1  N
 
0; !2

, st = wt + yt= (R  ) and t+1 = "t+1= (R  ).18 For
the rest of the paper we will restrict attention to points where ct < c, so that utility is increasing
and concave; following the literature we impose the restriction that R = 1, because it implies a
stationary path for consumption. This specication follows that in Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981)
and implies that optimal consumption is determined solely by permanent income:
ct = (R  1) st: (31)
16The excess smoothness puzzle states that consumption responds too little to permanent changes in income.
The excess sensitivity puzzle states that current consumption responds to changes in income that were anticipated
in earlier periods.
17Note that in this case, the ow budget constraint is wt+1 = Rwt   ct + yt.
18We can accomodate any income process that implies permanent income is nite; that is, nonstationary processes
are permitted provided they do not grow too quickly on average.
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As shown in Section 4.2, under RI, the consumer cannot observe the true state perfectly and
he needs to estimate the state using the Kalman ltering equation
bst+1 = Rbst   ct + t+1; (32)
where bst = Et [st] is the perceived state,
t+1 = R (st   bst) +  (t+1 + t+1) (33)
is the innovation to the mean of the distribution of perceived permanent income,
st   bst = (1  ) t
1  (1  )R  L  
t
1  (1  )R  L; (34)
Et [t+1] = 0 because the expectation is conditional on the perceived signals and inattentive
agents cannot perceive the lagged shocks perfectly,  =  1 is the Kalman gain, and given
s0  N (bs0;).19 Given (33), the variance of the innovation to the perceived state is !2 =
var (t+1) =

1 (1 )R2!
2
 > !
2
 , which means that !
2
 reects two sources of uncertainty facing
the consumer: (i) fundamental uncertainty, !2 and (ii) induced uncertainty, i.e., state uncertainty
due to RI,
h

1 (1 )R2   1
i
!2 . Therefore, as  decreases, the relative importance of induced
uncertainty to fundamental uncertainty becomes more and more important.
As shown in Luo (2008), the certainty equivalence principle holds in this RI-PI model and the
consumption function is:
ct = (R  1) bst; (35)
Combining (28), (35), with (32) yields the following expression for the change in consumption:
ct = (R  1)

t
1  (1  )R  L + 

t   Rt 1
1  (1  )R  L

; (36)
where L is the lag operator. We require (1   )R2 < 1, which is the stabilizability requirement
for this model (this condition implies (1   )R < 1 since R > 1). This MA(1) process shows
that the dynamic behavior of the model is strongly inuenced by the Kalman gain . Using the
explicit expression for consumption growth (36), we can compute the key stochastic properties
of consumption process: the volatility of consumption growth, the persistence of consumption
growth, and the correlation between consumption growth and income shocks. All these moments
depend on the Kalman gain .
19For the lter to converge to the steady state we need  > ln (R)  R  1.
18
It is worth noting that RI has di¤erent implications for consumption dynamics in a representa-
tive agent model or a model with a continuum of identical agents. The key reason is the presence
of the RI-induced endogenous noise, . Specically, if we regard the typical consumer discussed
above as the representative agent, (36) can be used to examine the implications of RI on aggre-
gate consumption. In this case, it is obvious that RI helps predict that aggregate consumption
is sensitive to lagged income information.20 Furthermore, the relative volatility of consumption
growth to income growth can be written as
  sd (ct)
sd (yt)
=
s

1  (1  )R2  1; (37)
when  = 1 for   1. Note that when the income process is a random walk,  is greater
than 1 when the representative consumer is inattentive, i.e.,  < 1. In other words, RI increases
the relative volatility of consumption growth, which exacerbates the excess smoothness puzzle
documented in the consumption literature.21 The intuition behind this result is as follows. From
(36), the behavior of consumption is determined by two channels: (i) the slow propagation channel
(the 1   (1   )R  L term) and (ii) the noise channel (the presence of t). In the representative
agent model, the noise channel dominates the slow propagation channel and thus the volatility of
consumption growth is higher under RI.
In the model with a continuum of identical consumers, aggregating across all individual con-
sumers facing the same aggregate income process using (36) yields the expression of the change
in aggregate consumption:
ct = (R  1)
"
t
1  (1  )R  L + 
 
t  
Rt 1
1  (1  )R  L
!#
; (38)
where i denotes a particular individual, Ei [] is the population average, and t = Ei [t] is the
common noise.22 This expression shows that even if every consumer only faces the common shock
20Furthermore, as documented in Reis (2006), the impulse response of aggregate consumption to aggregate income
takes a hump-shaped form, which means that aggregate consumption reacts to income shocks gradually.
21 In the US data aggregate consumption growth is much smoother than income and is sensitive to past informa-
tion. (In the US data, the smoothness ratio is around 0:56.) These two anomalies have been termed the excess
smoothness and excess sensitivity puzzles in the literature.
22For simplicity, here we use the same notation c for aggregate consumption. A purely technical point that we
ignore here is that it is not obvious that one can construct a continuum indepedent random variables in such a
way that their joint distribution is constant over time; Judd (1985), Uhlig (1996), and Sun (2006) propose various
methods for dealing with this problem.
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, the RI economy still has heterogeneity since each consumer faces the idiosyncratic noise induced
by nite channel capacity. As argued in Sims (2003), although the randomness in an individuals
response to aggregate shocks will be idiosyncratic because it arises from the individuals own
information-processing constraint, there is likely a signicant common component. Therefore, the
common term of the idiosyncratic error, t, lies between 0 and the part of the idiosyncratic error,
t, caused by the common shock to permanent income, t. Formally, assume that t consists of
two independent noises: t = t + 
i
t, where t = E
i [t] and it are the common and idiosyncratic
components of the error generated by t, respectively. A single parameter, e = var  t = var (t) 2
[0; 1], can be used to measure the common source of coded information on the aggregate component
(or the relative importance of t vs. t). The relative volatility in terms of  and  can be written
as
 =
s
2
1  [(1  )R]2 +
e2 
1  (1  )R2  
2
1  [(1  )R]2

: (39)
The assumption of e = 0 is equivalent to assuming that individuals do not interact with each
other directly or indirectly via conversation, imitation, newspapers, or other media. In this case,
the excess smoothness ratio  =
q
2
1 [(1 )R]2 < 1.
In contrast, the assumption of e = 1 (the representative agent case discussed above) means
that peoplesneeds for information coding are exactly the same and they completely rely on the
common source of coded information (everyone watches CNN). In this case,  =
q

1 (1 )R2 .
Hence, given the value of ,  2
hq
2
1 [(1 )R]2 ;
q

1 (1 )R2
i
. For example, if  = 50% and
 = 0:1, the model predicts that  = 0:58; which is close to its empirical counterpart in U.S.
data (around 0:56). The intuition is that in the model with a continuum of consumers, the slow
propagation channel dominates the noise channel when e is su¢ ciently low. Hence, RI provides
an alternative explanation to the two consumption excesses in this RI model with a continuum
of individuals.
Alternatively, if we assume that the cost of information processing () is xed, the optimal
conditional variance equals
 =
  [
 (R  1)  R] +
q
[
 (R  1)  R]2 + 4
R2
2 (R  1)R2 : (40)
Comparing (40) with  = 
=
 
exp (2) R2 obtained in the xed capacity case, it is clear that
the two modeling strategies are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same
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conditional variance if the following equality holds:
 =
1
2
ln
0BB@R2 + 2 (R  1)R2
 
h
(R  1) R

=!2
i
+
rh
(R  1) R

=!2
i2
+ 4R2

=!2

1CCA :
In this case, the Kalman gain is
 = 1 
8>><>>:R2 +
2 (R  1)R2
 
h
(R  1) R

=!2
i
+
rh
(R  1) R

=!2
i2
+ 4R2

=!2

9>>=>>;
 1
: (41)
After implementing these policies, !2 is scaled down to 0:5!
2
 (i.e., the economy switches to a
more stable environment) and the xed  theory predicts that the Kalman lter gain,  =  1,
is reduced. For example, before the government implements stabilization policies, we have =!2 =
0:000135 and  = 0:79. After the policy, we can easily calculate that  = 0:68 using (41). Figure
(2) plots the di¤erent implications of xed capacity and xed information cost for consumption
dynamics after implementing the stabilization policy: consumption growth reacts more slowly
to the income shock when  is xed. The intuition behind this result is simple. In the xed 
case some capacity will be reallocated to other sources because a reduction in macroeconomic
uncertainty leads to smaller welfare losses due to RI.
Comparison to Other Models of Sluggish Adjustment Here we briey compare the RI
model to two other formulations that imply sluggish adjustment in consumption. The rst,
denoted habit formation (HF), postulates that lagged consumption negatively a¤ects the marginal
utility of current consumption, either additively
u0 (ct; ct 1) = u0 (ct   gct 1)
for someg > 0, or multiplicatively
u0 (ct; ct 1) = u0

ct
ct 1

for some  > 0.23 In both cases, since ct 1 is xed and marginal utility declines with ct, the
consumer dislikes large changes in consumption. The second formulation is called inattentiveness,
23The lagged consumption terms can enter in more complicated ways, including with more lags (as in Otrok
2001) or in a nonlinear fashion (as in Campbell and Cochrane 1999).
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and presumes that agents infrequently update the information set they use to make decisions, so
that consumption will be nonresponsive to events that occur in between adjustment periods.
Luo (2008) compared the distinct implications of RI and HF for consumption dynamics, and
showed that the e¤ects of HF and RI on aggregate consumption could be similar or the same
because aggregating across all individuals would weaken or even eliminate the e¤ect of the en-
dogenous noise on consumption growth, i.e., e is su¢ ciently low or zero. HF implies that slow
adjustment in consumption is optimal because consumers are assumed to prefer to smooth not
only consumption but also consumption growth, whereas RI predicts that slow adjustment in
consumption is optimal because capacity constraints make consumers take more time to acquire
and process information. In other words, RI provides a non-psychological explanation for slow
adjustment in consumption that is caused by information-processing constraints rather than a
direct assumption of the structure of preferences. In addition, it is worth noting that HF af-
fects consumption decisions both with and without uncertainty, whereas RI a¤ects consumption
through its interaction with the fundamental uncertainty and it has no impact on consumption
in the absence of uncertainty.
In Reis (2006), a model of costly planning and inattentiveness, during the intervals of inat-
tentiveness consumption dynamics are determined by the standard deterministic consumers opti-
mization problem, whereas at the adjustment dates, consumption is determined by the standard
stochastic consumer problem. Reis (2006) showed that aggregate consumption growth exhibits
slow adjustment because newsdi¤uses across all individuals slowly. Hence, in the inattentive-
ness economy, individuals adjust consumption infrequently but completely once they choose to
adjust, and all the sluggishness in aggregate consumption comes from aggregating across all indi-
viduals. In contrast, individuals under RI adjust their optimal consumption plans frequently but
incompletely, and the sluggishness of aggregate consumption comes from individualsincomplete
consumption adjustments.
5.3.2 Implications for Consumption Volatility in Emerging and Developed Countries
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) consider two groups of small economies (emerging and developed
economies), and nd that consumption is more volatile than income at business cycle frequencies
for emerging markets, as compared to a ratio of less than one for developed markets. They show
that a small open economy (SOE) RBC model driven primarily by shocks to trend growth can
explain well this regularity about the relative volatility of consumption to income in emerging
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markets. However, by using a long time series data over 1900   2005, García-Cicco, Pancrazi,
and Uribe (2010) estimate an RBC model driven by the same shocks considered in Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007), and nd that the model does a poor job accounting for the observed business
cycle uctuations in Argentina and Mexico along a number of dimensions, including the relative
volatility of consumption to income. Luo and Young (2013) show that the RI model with a
xed information-processing cost can explain the observed di¤erence in consumption volatility in
emerging and developed countries.
The PIH model presented in Section 5.3.1 can be regarded as a SOE model in which the
constant interest rate is given exogenously and there are a continuum of consumers in the model
economy. Using (36) and assuming that all idiosyncratic errors are canceled out after aggregation,
the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth can be written as
  sd (ct)
sd (yt)
=
 
R  1
R  
r
1 + 
2
!s
2
1  ((1  )R)2 ; (42)
where sd () denotes standard deviation. It is straightforward to show that the relative consump-
tion volatility is decreasing with the degree of imperfect state observations because @=@ < 0. As
shown in Luo, Nie, and Young (2012), if there is no imperfect-state-observation assumption (i.e.,
 = 1), the model cannot generate the empirical relative consumption volatility. For example,
if R = 1:04, the full information model predicts that  in emerging and developed economies
would be 0:28 and 0:24, respectively. In contrast, in the data, the corresponding  values are
1:35 and 0:98, respectively.24 In the RI model with xed capacity,  is uniquely determined by
xed capacity  and thus has no impact on the cross-country comparison if emerging and devel-
oped counties have the same average amount of channel capacity. In contrast, if we adopt the
xed information-processing cost assumption, (41) and (42) can have the potential to generate
the observed di¤erence in consumption volatility in emerging and developed countries because 
is an increasing function of income uncertainty and income uncertainty in emerging countries is
much higher than that in developed counties (sd (y) =(y) is 3:82 in emerging countries, while
it is 2:07 in developed countries.) Intuitively, in developed counties consumers pay less atten-
tion to macroeconomic conditions because the fundamental uncertainty is low; consequently, the
aggregate consumption process in these countries is more stable relative to the income process.
24See Table 1 in Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) for the estimated income processes in both emerging and developed
countries.
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5.3.3 Equilibrium Asset Pricing Implications
The PIH model presented in Section 5.3.1 is usually regarded as a partial equilibrium model where
the return to saving R is taken as xed. However, as noted in Hansen (1987) and Cochrane (2005),
it does not have to be interpreted as a partial equilibrium result  it can be viewed instead as a
general equilibrium model with a linear production technology and an exogenous income process.
Given the expression of optimal consumption in terms of the state variables derived from the PIH
model with imperfect-state-observation, we can price assets by treating the process of aggregate
consumption that solves the model as though it were an endowment process. In this setup,
equilibrium prices are shadow prices that leave the agent content with that endowment process.
In the model setting specied in Section 5.3.1, w can be regarded as capital. R can be
regarded as the return on the linear technology and is not yet the interest rate (the equilibrium
rate of return on one-period claims to consumption). As proposed in Cochrane (2005) and used
in Luo and Young (2010b), after nding optimal consumption as in (35), we can price one-period
claims using this equilibrium consumption stream. Denoting the risk free rate by Rf , we have the
following Euler equation:
1
Rf
 Et


u0 (ct+1)
u0 (ct)

= Et

c  ct+1
c  ct

=  =
1
R
;
where Et [] is the consumers expectation operator conditional on his processed information at
time t. We can now use the basic pricing equation, p = E [mx],25 to compute the price of the
stream of aggregate consumption (treated as the stream of endowments) as26
pt = Et
24 1X
j=1
(mt;t+jct+j)
35 (43)
=
1
R  1ct| {z }
prnt
  1
c  ct| {z }
prat
;
where mt;t+j  j u
0(ct+j)
u0(ct) is the stochastic discount factor, and  
P1
j=1
 
j vart (ct+j)

=
(2 )R
1 R2(1 )!
2
 . Denoting the risk-neutral component by p
rn
t and the risk-adjusted component by
prat , we have
prnt =
1
R  1ct (44)
25Note that we know E [mx] after solving the PIH model given the state variables and can use them to determine
the asset price p.
26For the details of the derivation, see Luo and Young (2010b).
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and
prat =
1
c  ct
(2  )R
1 R2 (1  )!
2
 : (45)
(43) yield the following implications. The rst term in (43) is the risk-neutral component denoted
by prnt . This term can be regarded as the value of a perpetuity paying ct. The second term is the
risk-adjusted component, prat ; it lowers the asset price relative to the risk-neutral level because
ct  c and it is decreasing with the degree of attention ().
From (43) and (45), it is clear that the Kalman gain () also plays a key role in determining the
general equilibrium asset prices under RI. For example, if the economy switches to a more stable
environment due to the stabilization policy (i.e, !2 is scaled down to 0:5!
2
 ), the xed  assumption
predicts that the Kalman lter gain,  =  1, is reduced. Given that =!2 = 0:000135 and
 = 0:79, we can easily calculate that  = 0:68 using (41).
5.3.4 RI-induced Precautionary Savings
It is well known that the linear-quadratic model has some undesirable features. For example,
it satises the certainty equivalence property, ruling out any response of saving to uncertainty
(that is, precautionary behavior). Given that the important component of RI is the introduction of
endogenous uncertainty into the household problem, it is not particularly desirable to use a model
in which this uncertainty cannot manifest itself in decision rules. Fully nonlinear versions of the RI
problem are solved in Sims (2006), Lewis (2009), Batchuluun, Luo, and Young (2009), and Tutino
(2012); these papers show that the precautionary aspect of RI is important when channel capacity
is small. But the models solved in those papers have either very short horizons or extremely
simple setups due to numerical obstacles the state of the world is the distribution of true states
and this distribution is not well-behaved. It is important to nd a class of models that can
produce precautionary behavior while maintaining tractability in the RI setup, if the properties
of nite channel capacity are going to be thoroughly explored. Luo and Young (2010a) and Luo,
Nie, and Young (2012) examine how RI a¤ects precautionary savings within the risk-sensitive or
robust LQG settings. In a risk-sensitive model, agents e¤ectively compute expectations through
a distorted lens, increasing their e¤ective risk aversion by overweighting negative outcomes. The
resulting decision rules depend explicitly on the variance of the shocks, producing precautionary
savings, but the value functions are still quadratic functions of the states, leading again to the
optimality of Gaussian noise in the RI model. Thus, we can preserve the tractability of the LQ
PIH model without being forced to accept certainty equivalence. In the robust control model
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of Hansen and Sargent (1995), agents are concerned about the possibility that their model is
misspecied in a manner that is di¢ cult to detect statistically; as a result, they choose their
decisions as if the subjective distribution over shocks was chosen by a malevolent nature in order
to minimize their expected utility (that is, the solution to a robust decision-makers problem is
the equilibrium of a max-min game between the decision-maker and nature). Hansen and Sargent
(2007) present an observational equivalence result for RS and Robust models for consumption
and savings decisions: any consumption path that could be generated by a model featuring risk
sensitivity can also be generated by a model with robustness. Thus, introducing RI into the
Robust model is again straightforward, since the model retains the optimality of Gaussian noise.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2007), Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) use the multiplier preference
structure to introduce RB into the RI model proposed in Section 5.3.1:
bv (bst) = max
ct

 1
2
(ct   c)2 +  min
mt+1
Et [mt+1bv (bst+1) + #0mt+1 lnmt+1] ; (46)
subject to (32). Here mt+1 is the likelihood ratio, Et [mt+1 lnmt+1] is dened as the relative
entropy of the distribution of the distorted model with respect to that of the approximating
model, and #0 > 0 is the shadow price of capacity that can reduce the distance between the two
distributions, i.e., the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint:
Et [mt+1 lnmt+1]  e;
where e  0 denes an entropy ball of the distribution of the distorted model with respect to that
of the approximating model. Minimizing (46) with respect to mt+1 yields
mt+1 =
exp ( v (bst+1) =#0)
Et [exp ( v (bst+1) =#0)] ; (47)
and it is straightforward to show that substituting mt+1 into (46) yields the following Bellman
equation: bv (bst) = max
ct

 1
2
(ct   c)2 + Rt [bv (bst+1)] ; (48)
where
Rt [bv (bst+1)] =  #0 logEt [exp ( v (bst+1) =#0)] ;
subject to (32). (48) is a standard risk-sensitive (RS) dynamic programming problem and can be
easily solved using the standard procedure.27 The following proposition summarizes the solution
to the RB-RI model when R = 1.
27Risk-sensitivity was rst introduced into the LQG framework by Jacobson (1973) and extended by Whittle
(1981). Hansen and Sargent (1995) introduced discounting into the RS specication and show that the resulting
decision rules are time-invariant.
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Proposition 5 Given #0 and , the consumption function under RB and RI is
ct =
R  1
1 bst   c1  ; (49)
where bst is governed by bst+1 = sbst + c
1  + t+1; (50)
where s = 1 R1  2 (0; 1),
 =
R!2
#0
2 (0; 1) ; (51)
t+1 is dened in (33),
!2 =

1  (1  )R2!
2
 ;
and  = 1  1= exp(2). The value function is
v (bst) = 
bst   c
R  1
2
+ ; (52)
where 
 =  R(R 1)2(1 ) and  = #02(R 1) ln

1  (R 1)1 

.
Proof. See Online Appendix in Luo, Nie, and Young (2012).  < 1 can be obtained because the
second-order condition for the optimization problem is
R (R  1)
2
 
1 R!2= (#0)
 > 0; i.e.,  < 1:
It is clear from (49) and (51) determine the e¤ects of model uncertainty due to RB and
state uncertainty due to RI on the marginal propensity to consume out of perceived permanent
income (MPC) and the constant precautionary saving premium. It is clear from these two
expressions that  governs how RB and RI interact and then a¤ect the consumption function
and precautionary savings. Since  is increasing with the degrees of RB (less #0) and RI (less 
and ), it is straightforward to show that either RB or RI leads to more constant precautionary
savings and higher marginal propensity to consume, holding other factors constant and given that
 < 1.
Furthermore, in this case it is worth noting that RB and RI a¤ect consumption and precaution-
ary savings through distinct channels. RI a¤ects  via increasing the variance of the innovation
to the perceived state, !2, whereas RB a¤ects  via changing the structure of the response of
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consumption to income shocks. Furthermore, if we consider the marginal propensity to consume
out of true permanent income,
MPC  R  1
1 R= [#0 (1  (1  )R2)]!2
; (53)
we have the same conclusion about how induced uncertainty due to RB a¤ects the consumption
function but obtain di¤erent conclusions about how induced uncertainty due to RI a¤ects the
consumption function:
@ (MPC)
@#0
< 0;
@ (MPC)
@
> 0:
Note that there is a distinction between the model proposed above and a similar one used in Luo
and Young (2010a). In those other papers, agents were assumed to trust the Kalman lter they
use to process information, meaning that decisions were only robust to misspecication of the
income process. An implicit assumption in the two papers is that the evil agent (the minimizing
agent) has the same information set as the consumer (the maximizing agent). In that model 
was independent of , and for the questions at hand here the resulting values were too small. By
adding the additional concern for robustness developed here, we are able to strengthen the e¤ects
of robustness on decisions.
5.3.5 Long-run Consumption Risk and Portfolio Choice
Luo (2010) adopted the log-linear approximation method proposed by Campbell and Viceira
(2002) and Campbell (1993) to solve an RI version of the intertemporal portfolio choice model
after considering the long-term consumption risk facing investors. A major advantage of the
log-linearization approach is that we can approximate the original nonlinear problem by a log
linear-quadratic (LQ) framework when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is close to 1 and
thus can justify the optimality of Gaussian posterior uncertainty under RI.28
In the standard consumption and portfolio choice model, investors choose consumption and
28Luo and Young (2012) extended the result in Luo (2010) to non-expected utility preferences that separate
attitudes toward risk aversion across states from risk aversion over time (often called intertemporal substitution);
these preferences also have an interpretation as representing the model uncertainty aversion discussed previously.
Rather than extend an already long survey, we concentrate only on the expected utility case here. For completeness,
we note only that the key implication is that the investor have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty; as
RI pushes uncertainty revelation into the distant future, the fraction of risky assets declines and/or the premium
for holding them rises.
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asset holdings to maximize the intertemporal time-separable utility, dened over consumption:
max
fCt;tg1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu (Ct)
#
; (54)
where u (Ct) =
C1 t  1
1  is the power utility function, Ct represents individuals consumption at
time t;  is the discount factor, and   1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. There
are two tradable nancial assets in the model economy: Asset e is risky, with iid one-period
log (continuously compounded) return ret+1  N
 
; !2

, while the other asset f is riskless, with
constant log return given by rf . We refer to asset e as the market portfolio of equities, and asset
f as savings or checking accounts. The intertemporal budget constraint for the investor is
At+1 = R
p
t+1 (At   Ct) ; (55)
where At+1 is the individuals nancial wealth which is dened as the value of nancial assets
carried over from period t at the beginning of period t + 1, At   Ct is savings, and Rpt+1 is the
one-period gross return on savings given by
Rpt+1 = t

Ret+1  Rf

+Rf ; (56)
where Ret+1 = exp(r
e
t+1); R
f = exp(rf ); and t =  is the proportion of savings invested in the
risky asset.29 As shown in Campbell (1993), the following approximate expression for the log
return on wealth holds:
rpt+1 = (r
e
t+1   rf ) + rf +
1
2
(1  )!2: (57)
Following the log-linearization method proposed in Campbell (1993), Viceira (2001), and Camp-
bell and Viceira (2002), the original intertemporal budget constraint, (55), can be written in
log-linear form:
at+1 = (1  1=)(ct   at) +  + rpt+1; (58)
where c   a = E [ct   at] is the unconditional expectation of ct   at;  = 1   exp(c   a),  =
log   (1  1=) log(1  ); and lowercase letters denote logs.
When  is close to 1, the original CRRA utility function can be approximately by a linear-
quadratic form: ct + 12(1   )c2t . This log-LQG model can therefore t the RI-LQG framework
(at least approximately). Solving this RI problem yields:30
ct = log (1  ) + bat; (59)
29Given iid equity returns and power utility function, the share invested in equities, t, is constant over time.
30Here we have used the approximation result that  = . Note that  is independent of the degree of attention,
, because  approaches to  as  converges to 1.
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and the perceived state bat is characterized by the following Kalman lter equation:
bat+1 = (1  ) 1  1


ct +
1

bat   log  +  + at+1: (60)
Combining them gives the evolution of bat:
bat+1 = (1  )bat + at+1; (61)
where  = 1  1= exp(2) is the Kalman gain, at+1 = at+1 + t+1 is the observed signal, and t+1
are the iid noise with var (t+1) = =. Hence, combining equations (58), (59), with (61) gives
the expression for individual consumption growth:31
ct+1 = 

ut+1
1  ((1  )=)  L +

t+1   (=) t
1  ((1  )=)  L

; (62)
where L is the lag operator and ut+1 = ret+1   .
Since consumption reacts to the shock to the equity return slowly and with delay, we need
to consider the long-run risk when determining optimal asset allocation. Following Parker (2003)
and Parker and Julliard (2005), we dene the long-term consumption risk as the covariance of
asset returns and consumption growth over the period of the return and many following periods.
With nite channel capacity, we have the following equality for the risky asset e and the risk-free
asset f :
Et
h
Ret+1C
 
t+1+S
i
= Et
h
RfC t+1+S
i
;
which can be transformed to the following stationary form:
Et

Ret+1(Ct+1+S=Ct)
  = Et hRf (Ct+1+S=Ct) i ; (63)
where the expectation Et [] is conditional on the entire history of the economy up to t and
S is the horizon of many periods in the future over which consumption response under RI is
studied. Given the expression for consumption dynamics, it is clear that S is innitely large
because consumption takes innite periods to react to the exogenous shock. The standard equality,
Et[R
e
t+1C
 
t+1] = Et[R
fC t+1], does not hold here because consumption reacts slowly with respect
to the innovations to equity returns and thus cannot nish adjusting immediately and completely.
Log-linearizing equation (63) yields
Et

ret+1
  rf + 1
2
!2 =
SX
j=0
covart

ct+j+1; r
e
t+1

; (64)
31Note that this MA(1) expression requires that (1  )= < 1, which is equivalent to  > 1
2
log (1=) :
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where we have used  ' 1, ct+1+S ct =
PS
j=0 ct+1+j , and ct+1+j is given by (62). Specically,
the long-run impact of the innovation in the equity return on consumption growth can be rewritten
as
lim
S!1
0@ SX
j=0
covart

ct+1+j ; r
e
t+1
1A = &!2; (65)
where & is the ultimate consumption risk:
& =

1  (1  )= > 1 (66)
when the restriction 1   (1  ) = > 0, i.e.,  > 1    holds. The optimal share invested in the
equity is thus:
 =
1
&
  rf + 0:5!2
!2
; (67)
where 1=& = [1  (1  )=] = < 1: Furthermore, the consumption function is
ct = log (1  ) + bat; (68)
where (61),  = log    (1   1=) log(1   ),32 t are the iid idiosyncratic noise with !2 =
var [t+1] = =, and  = 
2!2
exp(2) (1=)2 is the steady state conditional variance. The change in
individual consumption can thus be written as
ct+1 = 

ut+1
1  ((1  )=)  L +

t+1   (=)t
1  ((1  )=)  L

: (69)
Proposition 6 Consider the optimal consumption and investment decisions (67)-(69). Suppose
that  is close to 1, and  > 1   . We then obtain the following expression for aggregate
consumption growth under RI:
ct+1 =
ut+1
1  ((1  ) =)  L; (70)
where  is the average degree of inattention in the model economy and  is the average optimal
share invested in the risky asset and is given by (67).33 This MA(1) process implies that: (1)
the standard deviation of consumption growth is
sd

ct+1

= !; (71)
32Here we use the facts that  = 1  exp(c  a) and c  a = E [ct   at] is the steady state value.
33That is,  = 1 (1 )=

 and  =  r
f+0:5!2
!2
is the optimal share invested in the stock market in the full-
information RE model.
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where the excess smoothness ratio  = (1  (1  )=) =
q
1  ((1  )=)2, (2) the correlation
between consumption growth and equity return is
corr

ct+1; r
e
t+1

=
q
1  ((1  )=)2; (72)
(3) the covariance between aggregate consumption growth and the asset return is
covar

ct+1; r
e
t+1

= !2; (73)
(4) the rst-order autocorrelation of consumption growth is
c(1) = corr

ct ;c

t+1

= (1  ) =; (74)
where j  1; and 5) the covariance between consumption growth and lagged equity returns is
covar

ct+1; r
e
t+1 j

=  ((1  )=)j !2; (75)
where j  1:
Proof. Using (70), it is straightforward to obtain the above results.
Expression (70) clearly shows that aggregate consumption adjusts gradually to the shock to
the equity return; RI a¤ects the amplication and propagation mechanism of the model by two
channels: (1) reducing the optimal share invested in the equity return , as  = 1 (1 )= ;
and (2) introducing a slow response of consumption to the equity return due to nite channel
capacity, 1 ((1 )=)L . Expression (70) also implies that to guarantee the existence of solution,
1   (1   )= must be greater than 0; note that this condition also guarantees that the optimal
share in the risky asset, , should be always greater than 0 as 1& =
1 (1 )=
 > 0.
Since ;  2 (0; 1), it is clear from (71)-(75) that RI can bring the model and the data closer
along the following dimensions: (i) RI reduces the relative volatility of consumption to the equity
return, (ii) it reduces the correlation and covariance between consumption and the equity return,
(iii) it generates positive serial correlation in consumption growth, and (iv) it generates positive
covariances between consumption growth and lagged equity returns.
It is clear that the relative volatility of consumption growth decreases with the degree of
attention () given . Furthermore, it is also clear from (71) that RI reduces the relative volatility
by two channels: (i) reducing the optimal share invested in the equity return

1 (1 )=


and
(ii) the gradual response of consumption to the equity return due to nite channel capacity
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q
2
1 ((1 )=)2

.34 Using (72), by simple calculation we obtain that @ corr@ > 0, that is, given ,
the correlation between aggregate consumption and the equity return (corr) increases with .
Related Papers on Portfolio Choice There are two papers that we want to mention briey
that use an alternative information friction, inattentiveness in the sense of Reis (2006), to study
portfolio choice: Huang and Liu (2007) and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2009). In those cases,
agents have to update their information sets but face costs that lead them to do so infrequently.
The implications are similar, but the underlying source of the cost of adjustment is unclear 
the costs of acquiring information do not seem to be large (for example, it is not particularly
costly to read the Wall Street Journal one morning); RI, on the other hand, is explicit about why
information ow is limited and thus can, in principle, be discplined externally.35
6 The Multivariate Case
We now move to presenting the multivariate RI environment in the LQG setting.
6.1 General Setting
In the multivariate RI problem, it is more di¢ cult to determine the steady state conditional
variance-covariance matrix  because it cannot be computed analytically. Following Sims (2003),
Luo and Young (2013) showed that solving the problem posed in (16) and (77) in Section 4.2 is
equivalent to solving the semidenite programming problem
max

ftrace ( Z)g (76)
subject to
  log (jj) + log  ATA+ 
  2; (77)
ATA+ 
  ; (78)
34 It is worth noting that (71) also implies that RI has a potential to explain the equity volatility puzzle because
 < 1; that is, the same volatility of consumption growth implies higher volatility of the equity in the presence of
RI. See Campbell (2003) for a detailed discussion for this puzzle.
35As an example, Landauer (1986) used experimental data to estimate the amount of information a human can
process; the di¢ cult part is taking that ow and determining how much is being allocated to economic decisisons.
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where Z = F TRF   2F TW +   F TBTPBF + F TBTPA+ATPBF  (see online appendix of
Luo and Young 2013 for the derivation). If the positive-deniteness constraint on ATA+ 
 ,
(78), does not bind, the rst-order condition for  can be written as:
 1 =
 
GGT +G0
 1   Z

; (79)
where G =
 
AT
 1
A and G0 =
 
AT
 1

A 1. We can then use standard methods to solve (79).
When applied to a permanent income model in the next subsection, we rst solve this equation
and then check whether in fact (78) is satised by the optimal solution of . If so, the problem
is solved. After computing the optimal steady state , we can then use (13) to determine the
steady state  and  =  1 to determine the Kalman gain .
When modeling the multivariate RI problem we only need to set a value for channel ca-
pacity and then compute optimal conditional variance-covariance matrices of the state and the
variance-covariance matrices of the noise vector by solving the constrained semidenite minimiza-
tion problem (76). Therefore, in the multivariate RI problem, the agents preference, budget
constraint, and information-processing constraints jointly determine the values of , , and ,
whereas in the multivariate SE problem given , (13) that is used to determine  and  only
depends on the budget constraint.36
6.2 The Multivariate Permanent Income Model
In this section we solve for optimal steady state  and  in a parametric multivariate RI permanent
income model. This example is similar to that discussed in Sims (2003) and considers multiple
income shocks with di¤erent stochastic properties. Specically, we assume that the original budget
constraint is as follows
wt+1 = Rwt   ct + yt+1; (80)
36Since the noise in the traditional SE problem is specied exogenously, it may violate the optimality conditions
for RI; for example, Melosi (2009) showed that a particular estimated SE model does not equate the marginal utility
of attention across states, implying that the variance-covariance matrix of the noise would not be consistent with
any channel capacity.
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where wt is the amount of cash-in-hand, and the income process yt have two persistent components
(x and z) and one transitory component ("y;t):
yt = y + xt + zt + "y;t;
xt = 0:99xt 1 + "x;t;
zt = 0:95zt 1 + "z;t;
with

 = var
2664
"y;t
"x;t
"z;t
3775 = 10 3
2664
0:9 0 0
0 0:009 0
0 0 0:27
3775 ; (81)
where xt is the most persistent and smooth component and "y;t is the most transitory and volatile
component. For the quadratic utility function u(ct) =  12 (ct   c)2 and setting  = 0:95, we can
compute that
 = 10 3
2664
0:1399  0:0737  0:0110
 0:0737 0:1596  0:1820
 0:0110  0:1820 0:5555
3775 ; (82)
when capacity  = 2:2 bits, which can be used to compute the variance of the noise  using
 1 =  1   	 1, and then compute the Kalman gain according to  =  1. It is clear from
(82) that due to the low capacity devoted to monitoring the state, the post-observation variances
(i.e., the conditional variances) of the x and z components are both greater than the corresponding
innovation variances in (81). More importantly, the conditional variance of the slow-moving x
component is 18 times larger than its corresponding innovation variance, whereas that of the
fast-moving z component is only 2 times larger than its innovation variance.37 The intuition
behind this result is that the optimizing agent devotes much less capacity to monitoring the
slow-moving component, which leads to greater e¤ects on the conditional variance term. Figure
(3) plots the impulse responses of consumption to the income shocks and noises. It shows that
consumption reacts to the income shocks gradually and with delay, and reacts to the corresponding
noises promptly. In addition, we can see that the response of consumption to the slow-moving
x component is much more damped than that to the fast-moving z component. It is also worth
noting that since the agent only cares about the trace of Z and the symmetric matrix Z is
37Alternatively, we can also see that the conditional variance of the x component is about 3 times smaller than
its corresponding unconditional variance (0:4523), whereas that of the z component is about 5 times smaller than
its corresponding unconditional variance (2:7692).
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negative semidenite, the agent with low capacity will choose to make the post-observations
of the states be negatively correlated. This correlation conserves capacity by permitting some
information about each state to be transmitted using a single nat.
When we relax the information-processing capacity and increase  to 2:8 nats, the conditional
covariance matrix becomes
 = 10 3
2664
0:0787  0:0419 0:0153
 0:0419 0:1172  0:1926
0:0153  0:1926 0:5170
3775 : (83)
Comparing (82) with (83), we can see that relaxing information-processing capacity has the largest
impact on the conditional variance of the endogenous state variable w: the post-observation
variance of w is reduced to about half the initial value. The intuition behind this result is that
the endogenous variable plays the most important role in the welfare losses due to RI. To see this
clearly, the matrix Z is displayed here:
Z = 10 2
2664
 0:0204  0:6732  0:2769
 0:6732  22:2156  9:1363
 0:2769  9:1363  3:7573
3775 : (84)
While w per unit has less of an e¤ect on welfare, it is proportionally much larger than either of the
other two state variables. It is also clear that as the information constraint is relaxed the agent
chooses to allocate more capacity to monitoring the slow-moving component x than to monitoring
the z component.
Note that for this problem (78) is not binding for any variable. It turns out that solving
the problem when  is small enough that the constraint would actually bind is very di¢ cult 
even frontier constrained optimization routines have trouble handling the problem. It is feasible
in this small model to systematically explore the e¤ects of the constraint binding by testing all
combinations, but for larger models this approach would become infeasible. The ideal approach
would be to extend the logic of the water-lling problem to the RI problem, but as noted above
this extension does not appear to be possible. The problem is that the variables interact in two
places in the objective function and in the information ow constraint. Because the variables
will be correlated, one cannot simply construct the bins independently  instead, the variables
must be rotated into an orthogonal set using a Spectral Decomposition of . The problem is that
this rotation does not decouple the variables in the objective function, where they are combined
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by the Z matrix, and there does not seem to be a way to method to handle this interdependence
in general. However, one special case arises where solutions are straightforward to obtain when
there is no state variable under the control of the decision-maker. We illustrate this environment
next using a model of rms making pricing decisions.
6.3 Attention Allocation in a Price-Setting Model
Our last application examines the price-setting decision of a monopolistically-competitive rm
that continuously observes noisy signals about two random variables: one aggregate variable and
one rm-specic variable. Under the full-information assumption, the prot-maximizing price (in
logs) of rm i, pi, can be written as
pfi = p+ xx+ zzi; (85)
where p is the log of the aggregate price level, x is the log of aggregate output, zi is an idiosyncratic
demand shock, and x and z are coe¢ cients that depend on structural parameters in the prot
function (the superscript f in the price function indicates full information). All the variables on
the RHS are assumed to be normally distributed. Since the sum of two normal variables is also
normal, we can summarize the aggregate condition as y = p+ xx such that
pfi = y + zzi; (86)
where y and z are assumed to be Gaussian variables with mean 0 and variances 2y and 
2
z ,
respectively. Under RI, the typical rm cannot observe y and zi perfectly, so all it can observe
are noisy signals y on the aggregate state and z on the idiosyncratic state:
y = y + y and z = zi + z; (87)
where the noises due to RI, y and z are Gaussian variables with mean 0 and variances !2y and
!2z , respectively. They are assumed to be independent with each other and are also not correlated
across rms.38 Given the observed independent noisy signals, the optimal price can be written as
pi = E [yjy] + zE [zijz] : (88)
Since pi is di¤erent from the full-information solution p
f
i , the rm su¤ers prot losses from RI.
The prot loss function of the rm can be written as
 =

2

pfi   pi
2
; (89)
38Mac´owiak and Wiederholt (2009) show that independent signals are optimal.
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where  > 0. Given (88) and (89), the attention allocation problem can be reduced to
min var

pfi jy; z

= 2yjy + 
2
2
2
zjz ; (90)
subject to the information-processing constraint (IPC):
1
2
ln
 
22y
  1
2
ln

22yjy

+

1
2
ln
 
22z

+
1
2
ln

22zjz

 ;
which can be reduced to
 2
yjy
 2
zjz
 2y  2z
 exp (2), where 2yjy and 2zjz are posterior conditional
variances of y and zi, respectively, and we use the facts that (1) for a quadratic objective function
and Gaussian state variables, it is optimal to choose the joint density of the states and noisy
signals to be also Gaussian and (2) the aggregate and idiosyncratic variables are uncorrelated.
After using the IPC to substitute out  2zjz , the optimal solution of 
2
yjy :
 2yjy
 2y
= exp ()
 1z
 yz 2 (1; exp (2)) ; (91)
which gives the ratio of posterior to prior precision of briefs about the aggregate condition under
the optimal attention allocation.39 (91) provides several important implications for the optimal
attention allocation to the aggregate condition. First, greater values of  2yjy=
 2
y mean that the
rm pays more attention to the aggregate signal. Second, given z,  2yjy=
 2
y is increasing with the
relative importance of the prior variances of the aggregate and rm-specic conditions. Since the
rm-specic shock is ten times more volatile than the aggregate shock as calibrated in Ma´ckowiak
and Wiederholt (2009), the rm optimally pays much more attention to the rm-specic shock.
Similarly, we can obtain the optimal
 2
zjz
 2z
:
 2zjz
 2z
= exp () jzj

y
z
 1
: (92)
Finally, using (91) and (92), we can easily recover the variances of the noises, !2y and !
2
z ,
! 2y = 
 2
yjy    2y ; (93)
! 2z = 
 2
zjz    2z : (94)
39Note that this ratio must be greater than 1, as otherwise the posterior variance would be higher than the
prior variance, which means that the rms forget. If this ratio is greater than exp (2), it violates the information-
processing constraint.
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Figures (4) and (5) display the dynamics of the price setting model. As can easily be seen,
the responses to the idiosyncratic shock under RE and RI are very similar, with only a one-period
gap in the initial period; the response to the noise shock lasts only for one period. As the solution
we derived above shows, almost all attention is allocated to tracking the idiosyncratic state, since
it is both highly volatile and very important for prots. The response to the aggregate shock is
sluggish, since the rm devotes little attention to tracking it, and so it takes a long time for the
RE and RI impulse responses to converge to each other. Figures (6) and (7) show the aggregate
consequences of RI while the individual price level does track the target price very closely, the
aggregate price level is very smooth relative to the RE case. Thus, RI may play an important
role in generating the sluggish response of prices discussed in Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt (2013),
where the authors document that prices respond rapidly to productivity (particularly idiosyncratic
productivity) but slowly to monetary policy.40
Finally, in the context of this model, Paciello and Wiederholt (2012) show how RI matters for
optimal policy. Under full information optimal monetary policy su¤ers from a standard form of
time inconsistency (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 for the denition of time inconsistency and its
relation to optimal government policy). Specically, if some prices do not adjust completely, the
central bank will want to announce zero ination (in order to keep price dispersion to a minimum)
but then ex post reduce prices using surprise ination; the problem is that since agents know this
incentive exists, the initial optimal policy cannot be implemented. RI adds a second element
to this story the government will also want to exploit the xed attention decision by shifting
variables that agents are not monitoring; again, households will anticipate this deviation and so
the initially-optimal plan is not implementable.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have surveyed the applications of rational inattention in macroeconomics. As
happens with most surveys, we have left quite a bit out, including interesting applications in search
and matching (Cheremukhin, Restrepo-Echavarria, and Tutino 2013), discrete choice (Matµejka
and McKay 2012), and planning for rare events (Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt 2012). We have also
left out alternative formulations of the attention problem, most notably Woodford (2012). More
40Other papers have built on this basic model to include capital (Menkulasi 2009), scal policy (Dworczak
2011), and multi-product rms (Pasten and Schoenle 2012). The multi-product rm model can actually undo the
sluggishness of aggregate states to shocks, depending on the exact nature of the information ow constraint.
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research is needed before we can condently say how attention should be modeled, but we are
certain that a lot of attention will be allocated to the problem.
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